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I. INTRODUCTION
The nature of trademarks appears to put them in conflict with the
goals of the European Community (EC) to dismantle territorial
boundaries and to promote the free movement of goods. This is
because trademark rights are defined by territorial boundaries.
Specifically, trademark rights depend on the jurisdiction of a particular
territory for their protection and on recognition by consumers of
particular nationalities in performing their functions. The EC has not
chosen to resolve this conflict by establishing a community-wide
trademark. Rather, the newly adopted EC Trademark Directive
assumes the continued coexistence of trademark rights under the laws
of the various member states.
Similarly, in treating territorial trademark rights under the free
movement of goods rules of the Treaty of Rome (EEC Treaty), the
Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) has fostered two
erroneous assumptions. First, the ECJ has assumed that trademark
rights are of relatively little importance when compared with patent
rights. Second, the ECJ has assumed that trademark rights are
inconsistent with the goals of the EC because of the territorial nature
of the rights. Proceeding from these assumptions, the ECJ has
substantially restricted trademark rights in the EC.
This article first reviews the economic function of trademarks.
Comparing this function to that of patents, this article concludes that
trademarks perform a useful function in promoting the efficient
allocation of resources. To the extent that the free movement of
* LL.B. 1981, Dip. L.P. 1982, University of Edinburgh; LL.M. 1986, University of
Virginia. Associate, McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, Washington, D.C. and Brussels, Belgium.
Assistant Professor, University of Maryland University College.
90 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 3:89
goods rules in the EC are intended to achieve the efficient allocation
of resources, trademark rights are consistent with the goals of the EC.
This article then examines the line of cases through which the ECJ
has restricted trademark rights. This examination indicates that some
of the doctrines established in these decisions are of dubious legal
origin and are contrary to the economic function of trademarks.
Finally, a reformulation of the doctrines propounded by the ECJ is
presented in order to reconcile the function of trademarks with the EC
goal of free movement of goods.
II. THE FUNCTIONS OF TRADEMARKS
The ECJ has recently suggested that trademarks serve two
functions: to protect the goodwill of the trademark owner and to
prevent confusion on the part of consumers who purchase trademarked
goods. In the terminology of the EC., the goodwill function is the
"specific subject-matter" of trademark rights, and the prevention of
consumer confusion is their "essential function."'1 The ECJ describes
the specific subject matter of trademarks as "the right [of the
trademark owner] to use that trade mark for the purpose of putting a
product into circulation for the first time and therefore to protect him
against competitors wishing to take advantage of the status and
reputation of the trade mark by selling products illegally bearing that
mark."' The ECJ characterized the essential function of trademarks
as the guarantee of "the identity of the origin of the marked product
to the consumer or ultimate user by enabling him without any
possibility of confusion to distinguish that product from products which
have another origin.... ."
In referring to the "status and reputation of the trade mark," the
ECJ contemplated the goodwill associated with the mark, which
includes the status and reputation of the particular products which bear
that mark.4 As Professor Landes and Judge Posner have argued,
trademark law does not reward the creation of the mark itself.S
Unlike patent law or copyright law, which reward creative effort,
trademark law does not reward the creation of a new word or logo,
1. Case C-10/89, SA CNL-Sucal NV v. HAG GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. 3711,3758,3 C.M.L.R.
571, 608 (1990) [hereinafter Hag Ilj.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78
TRA EMARK REP. 267, 271 (1988).
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but rather the investment of the trademark owner in the reputation of
its products.6
Trademarks may thus be distinguished from other types of
industrial property,7 such as patents and copyrights. The economic
function of patent law is to provide incentives for inventors to discover
novel technologies which may benefit society.' Similarly, copyright
law provides incentives to create works of art and literature for the
benefit of society.? Trademark law, on the other hand, does not exist
to reward the invention of the trademark or its artistic creation.
Immediately after the creation of a trademark it is probably of no
benefit to society."0
If one were to compare a trademark, in isolation from the product
it designates and the goodwill it signifies, with a major patentable
invention or a copyrightable work of art, one might doubt that the law
should accord to the former the same level of protection as the
latter." As Advocate General' Dutheillet de Lamothe observed:
"From the human point of view, the debt which society owes to the
inventor of the name Prep Good Morning is certainly not of the same
6. Id.; see also Hag II, 1990 E.C.R. at 3751, 3 C.M.L.R. at 604 (discussing the protection
of high quality goods as the fundamental justification for trademark protection).
7. This article will use the term "industrial property" to refer to patent, copyright,
trademark, and similar property rights. Such rights are probably more often referred to in the
United States as "intellectual property." The term "industrial property" has become the term of
art used to refer to such rights in the English version of EC legislation and case reports. See, e.g.,
Case 40170, Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda S.r.l., 1971 E.C.R. 69, 82, 1971 C.M.L.R. 260, 273 [hereinafter
Sirena v. Eda].
8. See, eg., W.R. CORNISH, INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT,
TRADEMARKS AND ALUED RIGHTS 78-80 (1989).
9. See Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 275.
10. Landes and Posner explore the economics of languages and of linguistic identifiers to
indicate that the invention of new words for new products provides a recognizable social benefit.
Id. at 272-73. Thus, words such as aspirin, cellophane, thermos, kleenex, and xerox (all words
invented to designate new products) provide useful methods to refer briefly to the articles that
they identify, without having to describe their physical or chemical characteristics, products, or
uses. Id. at 273. Landes and Posner conclude, however, that "[t]hese benefits.., are small," and
alone would probably not explain the existence of trademark law. Id.
11. See, eg., Sirena v. Eda, 1971 E.C.R. at 82,87,1971 C.M.L.R. at 264-65,273 (discussing
the degrees of protection afforded by trademarks and by copyrights).
12. The Advocates General of the Court of Justice are not judges, but their opinions
provide guidance to the ECJ in reaching its decision and are published with the ECJ's decision.
See TREATY ESTABUSHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art. 166.
For an example of a typical Advocate General submission, see Sirena v. Eda, 1971 E.C.R. at 85,
1971 C.M.L.R. at 261. The role of the Advocates General has been likened to that of an amicus
curiae, instructive to the ECY, but not binding upon it. See Richard S. Alembik, Recent
Developments, 19 GA. 3. INT'L & COMp. L. 613, 623 n.47 (1989).
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nature... as that which humanity owes to the discoverer of penicil-
lin. ,,A
Such a comparison is, however, misleading. It is not the invention
of the trademark which the law protects, but the investment over time
which its owner makes in the goodwill associated with the product to
which the trademark is affixed. The trademark becomes the symbol
that easily identifies both the product and its source. Assuming that
the owner of the mark makes repeat sales of the product, the mark
also becomes a guarantee of quality and consistency. 4 It is thus the
ability of the trademark to identify products, guarantee product
quality, and reduce consumer confusion that constitutes the primary
value of the trademark to society. Consumers who have enjoyed a
trademarked product can locate and buy that product again without
expending significant time and effort to ensure that the second
purchase is the same as the first.u The maker of the product also has
a continuing interest in maintaining the quality and consistency of the
trademarked product to build consumer loyality.16
While there is no guarantee that a trademark owner will not
change the products which it markets under a particular trademark, the
trademark owner has little incentive to market an inferior product or
a product which does not respond to consumer preferences, because
such a change will damage the goodwill associated with the mark. This
would result in a loss of the trademark owner's investment in the
creation of the mark and the associated goodwill. Eventually, the
trademark owner might alter the marked product, but it is likely that
any such alteration would be intended as an improvement. Moreover,
13. Sirena v. Eda, 1971 E.C.R. at 87,1971 C.M.L.R. at 264-65. For the Commission's early
view of trademark rights (which is as unsympathetic as that of Advocate General Dutheillet de
Lamothe), see COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIES, FIRsr REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 67 (1971) ('the partitioning of the Common Market by means of trade mark rights is
fundamentally contrary to the Community system of competition and is therefore inadmissible").
14. See Hag I, 1990 E.C.R. at 3751, 3 C.M.L.R. at 604. For a review of court approaches
to this theory in the United Kingdom and in the United States, see Lee Akazaki, Source Theory
and Guarantee Theory in Anglo-American Trademark Policy: A Critical Legal Study, 72 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 255,268-76 (1990).
15. Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 270-72. For an excellent treatment of the function
of trademark in reducing "consumer search costs," see 1 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3.1 (2d ed. 1986).
16. See Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 271; Hag II, 1990 E.C.R. at 3751, 3 C.M.L.R.
at 604. There is a class of trademarks, trade names (such as Nabisco, Kelloggs, and Gerber),
which denote the producer and not the product. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, §§ 4.1-4.4. Such
marks still provide a guarantee of quality because the mark owner will lose goodwill if products
bearing such marks fail to please.
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the trademark owner has an incentive to take steps-through
advertising, labelling, and store presentations-to educate the
consumer of the change. Consider, for example, designations such as
"new and improved," "advanced formula," and "now containing X."' 7
Even in the absence of any legal requirement that a trademark owner
may not confuse consumers by changing the product to which the
trademark is affixed, the owner's economic self-interest will discourage
him or her from doing so without taking steps to prevent consumer
confusion.
In the case of pirated or counterfeit goods emanating from a
producer other than the trademark owner to which goods the
trademark has been affixed without the consent of the trademark
owner, there is no such inherent protection against consumer confu-
sion. The pirate has significant incentive to promote consumer
confusion because he or she hopes that consumers of the genuine
trademarked product will buy his or her product instead, thus enabling
the pirate to take a free ride on the trademark owner's investment in
the goodwill associated with the genuine trademarked article.'" If the
pirates were permitted to free ride in this way, the trademark would
no longer serve its function of guaranteeing quality and preventing
consumer confusion. Moreover, if prospective trademark owners knew
that pirates would be allowed to free ride on their investment in
goodwill, they would be deterred from making the investment.
As is the case with other rights of ownership, the law provides
that the owner of a trademark may exclude others from its use.
Landes and Posner analyze trademark rights as property rights and
provide a useful definition of a property right as "a legally enforceable
power to exclude others from using a resource, without need to
contract with them."' 9 By granting the trademark owner a property
right in the trademark, which is the power to exclude others from
using it, society creates both the incentive for the trademark owner to
invest in goodwill and a self-policing mechanism ° to prevent consum-
17. The steps taken by Coca-Cola to alter its trademarked product, and the reintroduction
of "Classic Coke" in response to consumer outcry, illustrate the steps which a trademark owner
will take to preserve its goodwill. See Hey America, Coke Are It!, NEWSWEEK, July 22, 1985, at
40, 40-42.
18. See Hag II, 1990 E.C.R. at 3758, 3 C.M.L.R. at 608.
19. Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 267.
20. The "self-policing" notion is used to refer to the activity of the trademark owner in
enforcing his or her rights against infringers, rather than the "self-enforcing" concept to which
Landes and Posner refer. By "self-enforcing," Landes and Posner mean the incentive of the
trademark owner to maintain product quality. -Id. at 271.
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er confusion. The self-policing mechanism arises from the trademark
owner's self-interest which gives the owner the incentive to assume the
task of saving the consumer from the confusion that would result from
the sale of pirated products. To preserve the value of the owner's
property interest in the trademark, the trademark owner will take steps
to enforce his or her trademark rights against pirates. In exchange for
the trademark owner's performance of this policing function, society
allows the owner to reap the benefit of exclusive use of the trademark.
This is a bargain for society because granting exclusivity to the
trademark owner is the primary element necessary to prevent
consumer confusion' While other forms of property rights impose
costs on society by restricting the use of property that has an indepen-
dent value to society, no such costs are imposed by restricting the use
of a trademark. Instead, restricting the use of the trademark to its
owner actually enhances its value to society by enabling the owner,
and hence the public, to use that mark as a product identifier and
guarantor of quality.
Moreover, allowing the owner to restrict the use of the trademark
to exclude the products of others which bear the same mark serves a
useful function not only in the context of products emanating from
pirates who are seeking a free ride. Because of the territorial nature
of trademarks, the same mark may be attached to different products
by owners in different territories. In such a situation, each owner may
use his or her own mark in his or her own territory without the
intention of pirating or taking a free ride on the trademark in the
other territory. Nonetheless, consumer confusion is likely to arise if
the marked products intermingle in one or both of the territories. The
result may include damage to the goodwill of one of the trademark
owners.
In the words of Landes and Posner, "[a] proper trademark is not
a public good; it has social value only when used to designate a single
brand." According to this analysis, it is impossible to separate the
specific subject matter of a trademark from its essential function. The
21. Landes and Posner indicate that the costs of legally enforceable trademarks (to society)
are "modest" in the case of the truly "fanciful" mark. Id. at 275. Applying to trademarks the
four economic costs of property rights-the cost of transfer, rent seeking, the cost of protection
and enforcement, and the cost of restricting use-Landes and Posner demonstrate that these costs
are actually less than the cost of other property rights. Id. at 268-70, 275-76.
22. Id. at 276. Thus, whereas society may suffer if it is deprived of the use of a patented
invention or a copyrighted work, society actually benefits, from restrictions on the use of
trademarks.
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preservation of goodwill and the prevention of consumer confusion are
the same function, seen from two different viewpoints: that of the
owner and that of the consumer.
III. THE TERRITORIAL NATURE OF TRADEMARKS
Trademarks are defined geographically in the sense that they are
protected by the jurisdiction of a particular territory (de jure
territoriality).' Also, because trademarks depend on consumer
recognition in performing their functions, the scope of a trademark
necessarily coincides with the geographic territory in which products
bearing the mark have been sold in sufficient volume and for a
sufficient time to be recognized by consumers (de facto territoriality).
Due to these territorial characteristics of trademarks, it is possible
for the same mark to be recognized, de facto or de jure, for different
products in different territories. The development of the same mark
in different territories may occur purely by coincidence. For example,
the trademark "Persil" for a laundry detergent was developed in
England from a combination of the names of two of the chemicals
which it contains (perborate and silicate).' In France, the "Persil"
trademark was derived from a sprig of parsley (persil) which was
represented in the mark.' Similarly, a circle with a cross inside it
was conceived as a trademark by both the Bayer company (the cross
being formed by the word "Bayer" written vertically and horizontally,
intersecting at the "y") and by Tanabe Seiyaku of Japan (the cross
being formed by five small circles derived from a symbol representing
five Buddha figures).6 In an example from the EC, two manufactur-
ers of prefabricated construction facades, one in Germany and one in
23. While it is tempting to talk here of countries rather than territories, this would not be
accurate because some trademarks are protected by jurisdictions within countries, such as the
states of the United States, and some are protected for areas comprising more than one country,
such as Benelux (the countries of Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg). For a review
of the American experience with the territoriality of trademarks within the United States, see
William Jay Gross, Comment, The Territorial Scope of Trademark Rights, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1075 (1990).
24. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SEVENTH REPORT ON
COMPEITION POUCY 108 (1978).
25. Id.
26. See Tanabe Seiyaku Co. v. Bayer AG, (Commission Press Release, 1P78) 241 (1978),
reprinted in 2 C.M.L.R. 80, 80-81 (1979).
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England, independently conceived the trademarks "Terranova" and
"Terrapin," respectivelyY
It is also possible for the same mark to be attached to different
products. This results from a change in the ownership of a mark in
different jurisdictions and changes to those products by the different
owners in their respective jurisdictions. For example, the "Columbia"
record label, originally the trademark of the Columbia Phonograph
Company and registered by it before the First World War in both the
United States and the United Kingdom, ultimately became owned by
EMI in the United Kingdom and by CBS in the United States.'
Similarly, the "Prep" mark for shaving cream was originally owned by
the American manufacturer Mark Allen. It came to designate two
different products in Italy and Germany as a result of its use since at
least 1944 by an assignee of Mark Allen in Italy, while the original
product was sold by Mark Allen through a licensee in Germany.29 In
another example, the trademark "Advocaat Zwarte Kip" came to
represent different formulations of an egg liqueur in the hands of
different manufacturers following the assignment of the mark to a
Belgian corporation by its Dutch owner in 1938. °
Alternatively, trademark owners may themselves market different
products under the same mark in different territories. This practice
arises as a consequence of the de facto territoriality of a trademark,
and especially from the fact that consumer preferences vary from place
to place. A manufacturer may simply be responding to changing
consumer tastes in a particular market by altering the product for that
market over time. Also, separate divisions of the same corporate
group in various territories may be using the same mark for different
products. As was stated earlier, there is no reason to suppose that a
trademark owner will not seek to enhance goodwill by altering a
trademarked product; the assumption as to the behavior of the
trademark owner is only that the owner will not alter the product for
the worse.3' So the same mark may appear on different products, or
on different formulations of the same products which are destined for
27. Case 119175, Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie C.A. Kopferer & Co.,
1976 E.C.R. 1039, 1041, 2 C.M.L.R. 482, 484-85 (1976) [hereinafter Terrapin v. Terranova].
28. See Case 5175, EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd., 1976 E.C.R. 811,
813-15, 2 C.M.L.R. 235, 238-41 (1976) [hereinafter EMI Records].
29. See Sirena v. Eda, 1971 E.C.R. at 85, 1971 C.M.L.R. at 262.
30. See Commission Decision of 24 July 1974 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 85
of the EEC Treaty, 1974 OJ. (L 237) 12.
31. See supra note 4 and accompanying text
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different markets, even though the products may originate from, and
the marks may be owned by, the same corporate group or controlled
licensees. Cases illustrating this phenomenon have been reported
involving beer, 2 aperitif,33 and soap.'
IV. TRADEMARK RIGHTS IN THE EC
In light of the fact that the same mark may come to designate
different products in different territories, it would be consistent with
the function of trademarks to permit the owner of a trademark in one
territory to use his or her trademark rights to exclude a different
product bearing the same mark from being imported into the owner's
territory. 5  Such a use of the trademark would both protect the
trademark owner's investment and prevent consumer confusion. This
is the case regardless of whether the imported products are counterfeit
goods deliberately manufactured and marked by a pirate attempting
to free ride on the trademark owner's goodwill, or whether the
imported products are genuinely marked products in their original
territory. 6
EC law permits a trademark owner to exclude counterfeit
goods. 7 The ECI, however, has declined to permit a trademark
owner to use trademark rights to prevent the movement between
member states of his or her own products or products of foreign
32. See, eg., Romano Subiotto, Moosehead/Whitbread: Industrial Franchises and No-
Challenge Clauses Relating to Licensed Trade Marks under EEC Competition Law, 12 EIR.
INTEU.. PRoP. REv. 334 (1990) (discussing a Commission decision involving the marketing of
Moosehead beer in Canada and England).
33. See, e.g., Case 120178, Rewe-Zentral AGv. Bundesmonopolverwaltung filrBranntwein,
1979 E.C.R. 649,673,3 C.M.L.R. 494,504 (1979) (involving a more alcoholic formulation of the
"Cassis de Dijon" aperitif produced specifically for the German market due to German
government regulations).
34. See, &g., Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, No. 86-3151 (HHG), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7876, at *4-*5 (D.D.C. April 15, 1992), appeal docketed, No. 92-5185 1992, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23155 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (involving the efforts of Lever Brothers to prevent the importation
of "Shield" soap which is marketed by its own affiliate in the United Kingdom on the grounds
that the British soap differs from the American version).
35. See K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,287-88 (1988).
36. A third case is that of parallel imports of marked products produced by manufacturer
X, which it sells identically in territories A and B, being imported from territory B to territory
A without X's consent. Id. at 286-87.
37. Council Regulation 3842/86 of 1 December 1986 Laying Down Measures to Prohibit
the Release for Free Circulation of Counterfeit Goods, 1986 OJ. (L 357) 1, 2. For a comparison
of American and EC law on counterfeit goods, see Donna L. Tritter, The EECs Attempts to Stop
the Importation of Counterfeit Goods, 12 B.C. INT'L & COM. L. REv. 423 (1989).
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affiliates.' The same rule applies to products of unaffiliated foreign
entities whose title to the trademark in question is traceable to a
common origin, provided the different current ownerships of the
trademarks were obtained with the consent of the original owner. 9
A. The EC Principle of Free Movement of Goods
In the absence of clear legislative guidance from either the EEC
Treaty or secondary legislation directed at resolving the apparent
tension between the territorial nature of trademarks on the one hand
and the aim of the EC of achieving a "common market" in goods on
the other, the ECJ has attempted to craft a resolution from first
principles.' In so doing, the ECJ has adopted a restrictive approach
to trademarks in an apparent effort to forward the fundamental aim
of the EC to ensure the free movement of goods throughout EC
territory.4
The fundamental principle of the free movement of goods is
entrenched in the EEC Treaty.2 The EEC Treaty provides that to
achieve economic integration, which is the ultimate goal of the EC, the
activities of the Community will include: "the elimination, as between
Member States, of customs duties and of quantitative restrictions on
the import and export of goods, and of all other measures having
equivalent effect ... ."' The EEC Treaty goes on to specify the de-
tailed provisions relating to the free movement of goods as the first of
the "foundations of the Community."" For example, Article 9 of the
EEC Treaty provides that "[t]he Community shall be based upon a
customs union.., which shall involve the prohibition ... of customs
38. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
39. See, eg., Hag I, 1990 E.C.R. at 3758, 3 C.M.L.R. at 608; Sirena v. Eda, 1971 E.C.R. at
81-83, 1971 C.M.L.R. at 272-74.
40. See David C. Wilkinson, The Community Trade Mark Regulation and its Role in
European Economic Integration, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 107, 115-20 (1990) (discussing the
development of ECI case law concerning trademark rights).
41. See, e.g., Hag II, 1990 E.C.R. at 3757, 3 C.M.L.R. at 606 (emphasizing the ECJ's
consistent application of the principle of free movement of goods and restricting exceptions to
this principle to the facts of the case).
42. EEC TREATY art. 3(a). For a recent overview of the EC rules on the free movement
of goods and relevant recent case law, see David T. Keeling, The Free Movement of Goods in
EEC Law: Basic Principles and Recent Developments in the Case Law of the Court of Justice of
the European Communities, 26 INT'L LAW. 467 (1992).
43. EEC TREATY art. 3(a).
44. Id. arts. 9-37.
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duties,"'45 and Article 12 prohibits member states from introducing
new customs duties between themselves. 6  Article 30 prohibits
quantitative restrictions (quotas) and "measures having equivalent
effect."'47 While Article 30 does not expressly prohibit all member
state laws and practices which could hinder trade in goods (i.e.,
barriers to trade), the ECJ has so construed it.
Due to the de jure territoriality of member state trademark rights,
the ECJ has used the language of Article 30 to posit that trademark
rights are potentially subject to attack as measures having an equiva-
lent effect to quantitative restrictions.49 The EEC Treaty, however,
expressly saves member state trademark rights from total extinction.5'
Trademark rights, as creatures of member state property law, are
preserved by the provision in the EEC Treaty that it will "in no way
prejudice the rules in member states governing the system of property
ownership."'" Moreover, the right of property ownership in trade-
marks and other types of industrial policy under member state rules
are specifically contemplated by the rules on free movement of goods,
which provide that: "[t]he provisions of Article 30 to 34 shall not
preclude . . . the protection of industrial and commercial property.
Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means
of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between
Member States."'
B. Trademark Territoriality and the EC
The territoral nature of trademarks is particularly prominent in
the EC due to the historical separation of national markets. This
separation has produced different consumer preferences (de facto
territoriality). In addition, the lack of a community-wide trademark
45. Id. art. 9. Article 9 also prohibits "charges having equivalent effect" to customs duties.
Id.
46. Id. art. 12. For the seminal ECJ decision on the application of Article 12, see Case
26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse
administratie der belastigen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 1963 C.M.L.R. 105.
47. EEC TREATY art. 30. Article 34 contains similar provision relating to exports. Id. art.
34.
48. See, e.g., Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 2 C.M.L.R. 436
(1974) (requirement of certificate of authenticity not easily obtainable by segment of importers
has effect equivalent to quantitative restriction).
49. See, e.g., Case 1674, Centrafarn BV and Adriann De Deijper v. Winthrop BV, 1974
E.C.R. 1183, 2 C.M.L.R. 480 (1974) [hereinafter Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BT].
50. See EEC TREATY art. 36.
51. Id. art. 222.
52. Id. art. 36.
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system has left trademark rights a creature of the national laws of each
member state (de jure territoriality). Nevertheless, the EEC Treaty
does not establish a Community trademark. Since the inception of the
Community, the member states and the institutions of the EC have
been striving toward the development of a Community trademark, and,
having been frustrated in that effort, toward harmonizing the trade-
mark laws of the member states. 3
The original member states of the EC began work on a trademark
convention, separate from the institutional structure of the EEC
Treaty, in the early years of the Community.' A Draft Convention
was prepared in 1964, but the drive to adopt a Community trademark
lost impetus due to the more fundamental political questions which
were raised in the early 1960s as to the future of the Community
itself.5 The question of a European trademark lay fallow until 1969
when the Commission of the European Communities (Commission)
again took up the cause by publishing the 1964 Draft Convention and,
later, a Commentary Memorandum. 6
By the 1970s the position of the Commission was that a Communi-
ty trademark could be achieved within the institutional framework of
the EEC Treaty, rather than by a freestanding Convention, and that
in any event the Draft Convention of 1964 was anachronistic in light
of subsequent developments in the Community and the case law of the
ECJ.57 The Commission therefore proposed a Regulation to establish
53. See Amended Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Trade
Mark, 1984 OJ. (C 230) 1,1-3. See generally Alexander von Mtfflendahl, The Future Community
Trade Mark System, 20 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 583 (1989) (discussing the
negotiations regarding a Community trademark and the particularly contentious issues posing
obstacles to an agreement).
54. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, PROPOSED EUROPEAN TRADE MARK:
UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF A PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF A CONVENTION FOR A EUROPEAN
TRADE MARK, reprinted in Convention for a European Trade Mark, 3 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 5873 (1974). For a review of attempts to establish EC patent and trademark protection
in the context of other (non-EC) international conventions on the international protection of
industrial property, see Martin J. Lutz, Community Patent and Trademark, 9 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 101 (1990). For the current status of the Madrid Agreement of 1891 (an international
trademark convention with twenty-nine countries as members), see Ian Jay Kaufman, Madrid
Agreement: Will Reform Proposals Attract More Members?, 11 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 407,
407-10 (1990).
55. For a summary of the provisions of the draft convention and its fate, see Memorandum
on the Creation of an EEC Trade Mark, BULL. EUR. COMMUNrTIEs 5, 5-6 (Supp. 876)
[hereinafter Commission Memorandum].
56. Id. at 5.
57. Id. at 6.
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a Community trademark.58 Later, as the Regulation became mired
in political debate over the location of the EC trademark office, the
Commission resigned itself to the continuing application of member
state trademark law, but proposed a directive which would at least
harmonize the existing national laws of the member states.59
The Regulation, which remains a draft, would have established a
community-wide trademark, just as the Lanham Act established a
federal trademark in the United States.6° The Directive, however,
permits the individual trademarks of the member states to continue in
existence.6' The Directive is intended to harmonize certain provisions
of member state trademark law, such as requirements for registra-
tion62 and definitions of infringement.63 Even if the Directive, which
has been adopted, is fully implemented into the national laws of the
member states, it will not address the de jure territoriality of those
national laws.' Moreover, not even the establishment of a communi-
ty-wide trademark law can overcome de facto territoriality and, in
particular, the historical fact of conflicting marks and consumer
preferences.6 As the EC expands, this problem is likely to persist
and become aggravated.'
58. Amended Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Trade
Mark, supra note 53, at 40. Note that the provisions of Articles 30 and 34 of the EEC Treaty
apply to member state laws only and would not therefore apply to a Community trademark. See
EEC TREATY arts. 30, 34.
59. See Council Directive 89/104 of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the Laws of the
Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 1989 OJ. (L 40) 1 [hereinafter Directive]. The member
states were required to implement the Directive's provisions into their national laws by December
28, 1991. Id. art. 16(1).
60. Compare Amended Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community
Trade Mark, supra note 53, with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-127 (1988).
61. For a review of the historical context of the EC proposals, and a comparison with the
American experience of coexistence of state and federal trademark law, see Wilkinson, supra note
40, at 107.
62. Directive, supra note 59, art. 3(1).
63. Id. art. 5(1).
64. See Commission Memorandum, supra note 55, at 12-14. For a comparison of British
trademark law with practices elsewhere in the EC, see CORNISH, supra note 8, at 482-94.
65. See, e.g., Burger King of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968) (discussing
the American experience with the "Burger King" mark). Under the Lanham Act, the mark is
protected nationwide. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-127 (1988). However, the Lanham Act will not be used
to eliminate one of the conflicting "Burger King" businesses if consumer confusion is minimal.
See Hoots, 403 F.2d 908-09.
66. See, e.g., Nicholas/Vitapro, summarized in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION PoLIcY 87 (1976) (assignment of trademarks
and patents for "Vitapointe" hairdressing products from a French company to a British company
reexamined after British entry into the EC in 1973).
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V. THE TRADEMARK DOCTRINE OF THE ECJ
In the series of decisions discussed below, the ECJ has read the
provisions of the EEC Treaty restrictively, promoting its view of the
free movement of goods at the expense of trademark rights. These
decisions are analyzed according to three doctrines that the ECJ has
developed. The first is the existence/exercise dichotomy, the second
is the exhaustion doctrine, and the third is the doctrine of common
origin.
A. Existence/Exercise Dichotomy
The ECI first addressed the apparent tension between the free
movement of goods rules and trademark rights in the Consten and
Grundig cases.' Grundig, a German manufacturer of consumer
electronics, marketed its products under the "GINT" trademark
(standing for Grundig International) in Germany." Grundig's
exclusive distributor in France, a company named Consten, had
registered the "GINT" mark in France with Grundig's blessing.69 A
discounter named UNEF purchased Grundig equipment bearing the
"GINT" mark in Germany and then sold it to French consumers for
less than the prevailing price in France.' Subsequently, Consten
instituted proceedings in a French court seeking to use its French
trademark rights to prohibit UNEF's imports.7 UNEF complained
to the Commission that such a result would be contrary to the EEC
Treaty.72
The Commission took the view that the exclusive distributorship
agreement, including Consten's rights in the GINT trademark, violated
the competition provisions of the EEC Treaty, specifically Article
85.' Consten and Grundig challenged the Commission's decision in
67. Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, ttablissements Consten SARL and Grundig-Verkaufs-
GmbH v. Commission of the EEC, 1966 E.C.R. 299,1966 C.M.L.R. 418 [hereinafter Consten and
Grundig].
68. Id. at 303, 1966 C.M.L.R. at 420.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 303-04, 1966 C.M.L.R. at 420-21.
72. Id. at 304, 1966 C.M.L.R. at 421.
73. Id. Article 85(1) prohibits agreements and practices "which have as their object or
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market .... "
EEC TREATY art. 85(1). On the application of the EC rules of competition to distributorships
generally, see VALENTMNE KORAH & WARWIcK A. ROTHNIE, ExcLusIVE DISTRIBUTION AND
THE EEC COETIMON RULES (1992). On the application of the competition rules to industrial
and intellectual property rights generally, see 2 BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMoN
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court, arguing that it violated Articles 36 and 222 of the EEC
Treaty.74 The ECI side-stepped the Article 36 argument by noting
that Article 36 limits the application of Article 30, but does not limit
the application of Article 8V' As to the Article 222 argument, the
ECJ determined that Article 85, as interpreted by the Commission's
decision, leaves the existence of property rights under national law
"untouched," but "limits their exercise to the extent necessary to give
effect to the prohibition" of Article 85(1).76 This has become known
as the existence/exercise dichotomy. Although the ECJ concluded that
rights which could not be exercised were nonetheless untouched, this
proposition seems questionable.'
The ECJ extended the distinction between the existence and the
exercise of industrial property rights to limit the extent of Article 36
exceptions to the Article 30 prohibition in Deutsche Grammophon.78
Deutsche Grammophon, a manufacturer of sound recordings, was the
owner of industrial property rights akin to copyright in Germany.
Deutsche Grammophon records were also sold in France, but at a
price lower than the prevailing price in Germany." Therefore,
Metro, a major supermarket chain, purchased Deutsche Grammophon
records in France and imported them for sale in Germany. Relying on
its German industrial property rights, Deutsche Grammophon
instituted an action in the German courts for infringement, seeking
exclusion of the imports.' The German court referred the matter to
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the application of Community law
to national industrial property rights."
MARcET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTTRUST. A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 575-737 (2d ed. 1990); Ivo
VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANqOIS BELLiS, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EEC 152-81 (2d ed. 1987).
74. Consten and Grundig, 1966 E.C.R. at 317,1966 C.M.L.R. at 475. Consten and Grundig
also argued that the Commission's decision violated Article 234, relating to agreements which
existed before the entry into force of the EEC Treaty. Id.
75. See id. at 345, 1966 C.M.L.R. at 476.
76. Id.
77. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
78. Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmdrkte
GmbH & Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R. 487, 512, 1971 C.M.L.R. 631, 654-55 [hereinafter Deutsche
Grammophon].
79. Deutsche Grammophon apparently maintained resale prices of its records in Germany
by entering agreements with retailers pursuant to which the retailers agreed to resell only at
prices established by Deutsche Grammophon. Deutsche Grammnophon agreed to supply only
retailers who signed the agreements. Id. at 490, 1971 C.M.L.R. at 633-34.
80. Id., 1971 C.M.L.R. at 634.
81. Id. at 490-91, 1971 C.M.L.R. at 636. The procedure for such referrals from the courts
of the member states to the ECI is provided by Article 177 of the EEC Treaty. See EEC
TREATY art. 177.
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Because Deutsche Grammophon's assertion of its industrial
property rights against Metro was unilateral, there was no agreement
like the distributorship agreement in Consten and Grundig which could
violate Article 85(1). If Deutsche Grammophon had violated the EEC
Treaty, it could only have violated the general provisions on the free
movement of goods. The ECJ was therefore forced to address the
extent of the Article 36 derogation from the principles of free
movement of goods. Again, the ECJ based its analysis on the view
that while "the Treaty does not affect the existence of the rights
recognized by the legislation of a Member State with regard to
industrial and commercial property, the exercise of such rights may
nevertheless fall within the prohibitions laid down by the Treaty."'
Finding no specific prohibition in the EEC Treaty against the exercise
of national industrial property rights to exclude imports, the ECJ
found that a prohibition was dictated by "the essential purpose of the
Treaty, which is to unite the national markets into a single market."8
The ECJ therefore concluded that Article 36 could not permit the
owner of a national industrial property right to exclude products
marketed by it, or with its consent, since this would isolate national
markets in contravention of the purpose of the EEC Treaty.'
B. The Exhaustion Doctrine
In Deutsche Grammophon, the ECJ sought to justify its creative
reading of the EEC Treaty by considering that Article 36 only permits
derogations from the free movement of goods to the extent necessary
to safeguard those rights which are the specific subject matter of the
industrial property in question.' The ECI first defined the specific
subject matter of a trademark in Centrafarm v. Winthrop." The
Winthrop case is one of a series of cases involving Centrafarm, a
discount drug supplier which identified the market opportunity
resulting from disparities in price among the member states for various
82. Deutsche Grammophon, 1971 E.C.R. at 499-500, 1971 C.M.L.R. at 657.
83. Id. at 500, 1971 C.M.L.1. at 657.
84. Id., 1971 C.M.L.R. at 657-58. For a review of recent ECJ decisions on the
existence/exercise dichotomy in the context of industrial property rights other than trademark
rights, see Georges Friden, Recent Developments in EEC Intellectual Property Law: The
Distinction between Existence and Exercise Revisited, 26 CoMMON MKT. L. REv. 193 (1989).
85. See Deutsche Grammophon, 1971 E.C.R. at 500, 1971 C.M.L.R. at 657.
86. Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. at 1194,2 C.M.L.R. at 508.
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patented and trademarked drugsY Centrafarm would purchase drugs
at a low price in one country and import them into a country where
they were being sold at a higher price. Because consumer preferences
and historical practice in different countries sometimes called for
different presentations of the product, however, Centrafarm would in
some instances repackage the drugs.
The first Centrafarm decision, Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug
Inc., involved a drug known as "Negram," on which Sterling Drug held
British and Dutch patents.' Centrafarm purchased Negram in the
United Kingdom and imported it into The Netherlands, where the
prevailing price was higher. Sterling Drug tried to use its Dutch patent
rights to prevent such imports. The ECJ took the opportunity to
define the specific subject matter of a patent right as:
the guarantee that the patentee, to reward the creative effort of the
inventor, has the exclusive right to use an invention with a view to
manufacturing industrial products and putting them into circulation
for the first time, either directly or by the grant of licenses to third
parties, as well as the right to oppose infringements.89
The ECJ held that this right of first use under the national patent law
of any member state was exhausted by Sterling Drug's sale of its
products anywhere in the Community.' Thus, The Netherlands
patent right was exhausted not only by a sale in The Netherlands, but
also by a sale in the United Kingdom. Accordingly, Sterling Drug
could not use its patent rights in one member state (The Netherlands)
to keep out products which it had itself marketed in another member
state (the United Kingdom).
The ECJ reached a similar conclusion in the second Centrafarm
decision, Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV.91' The Winthrop BV case
87. See Case 107/77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, 1978 E.C.R. 1139, 3 C.M.L.R. 217 (1978) [hereinafter
Hoffman-La Roche]; Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV and Adriaan De Deijper v. Sterling Drug Inc.,
1974 E.C.R. 1147,2 C.M.L.R. 480 (1974) [hereinafter Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc.]. For
a review of the problems encountered by drug companies in Europe faced with the EC's principle
of free movement of goods on the one hand, and regulation of market forces by the member
states imposing price restrictions, compulsory licenses, and other regulatory strictures in the
market for medicines on the other hand, see Hans-Christian Kersten, "Gray Market" Exports and
Imports Under the Competition Law of the European Economic Community, 78 TRADEMARK
REP. 479 (1988), and for a review of relevant case law, see Andrew Geddes, Free Movement of
Pharmaceuticals within the Community: The Remaining Barriers, 16 EUR. L. REV. 295 (1991).
88. Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Ina, 1974 E.C.R. at 1149,2 C.M.L.R. at 484.
89. Id. at 1162, 2 C.M.L.R. at 503.
90. Id. at 1162-63, 2 C.M.L.R. at 503-04.
91. Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. at 1195,2 C.M.L.R. at 509.
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also involved the purchase by Centrafarm of Negram in the United
Kingdom and its import into The Netherlands. Winthrop owned The
Netherlands trademark "Negram," which was the basis for its challenge
to Centrafarm's imports. The ECJ defined the specific subject matter
of trademark rights as:
the guarantee that the owner of the trade mark has the exclusive
right to use that trade mark, for the purpose of putting products
protected by the trade mark into circulation for the first time, and
is therefore intended to protect him against competitors wishing to
take advantage of the status and reputation of the trade mark by
selling products illegally bearing that trade mark.'
The ECJ concluded that the owner of a trademark in one member
state could not use his or her trademark rights to prohibit the sale in
that member state of a product which he or she had itself marketed in
another member state, or which had been marketed with his or her
consent.3
Presumably emboldened by its success before the ECJ in these
two cases, Centrafarm went on to purchase valium marketed by
Hoffmann-La Roche under its trademarks "Valium" and "Roche." 94
Centrafarm purchased the valium in the United Kingdom, repackaged
it in The Netherlands, reaffixed the "Valium" and "Roche" marks to
the new packages with an annotation that they had been packaged by
Centrafarm, and imported the marked product into Germany.
Hoffmann-La Roche, in reliance on its German registered trademarks,
sought an injunction in a German court against Centrafarm's use of the
trademarksY
The ECJ repeated its formulation for the specific subject matter
of the trademark as the guarantee to the trademark owner of the
exclusive first use of the trademark.' The ECJ recognized that under
the first sentence of Article 36 the trademark owner has the right to
prevent an importer of repackaged products from affixing the
trademark, even to the importer's own products, without the owner's
consent.' The ECJ, however, went on to consider whether such a
92. Id. at 1194,2 C.M.L.R. at 508. Note that whereas the ECI included the right to license
within the specific subject matter of a patent, it did not in the case of a trademark. Compare
Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. at 1162,2 C.M.L.R. at 503, with Centrafarm BV
v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. at 1194,2 C.M.L.R. at 508.
93. Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. at 1195,2 C.M.L.R. at 509.
94. See Hoffinann-La Roche, 1978 E.C.R. at 1142, 3 C.M.L.R. at 219-20.
95. Id., 3 C.M.L.R. at 220.
96. Id. at 1164, 3 C.M.L.R. at 241.
97. Id.
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use of the trademark might not violate the second sentence of Article
36, thereby depriving the trademark owner of the Article 36 exemption
and, under Article 30, depriving him or her of the right to prevent the
parallel import.' The ECJ deferred to the national trial court to
consider the nature of the product and the method of repackaging
involved.9 For some products, repackaging would affect the condi-
tion of the products and therefore could be prohibited under Article
36."° For others, however, which could be repackaged without
affecting their condition and on which a statement could be placed to
notify consumers as to who was responsible for the repackaging, the
ECJ held that the essential function of the trademark (to identify the
origin of the product and to guarantee its condition) would be
adequately served, and Article 36 would not allow the prohibition of
the parallel import.''
In the last of the Centrafarm cases, Centrafarn BV v. American
Home Products, the ECJ extended its reasoning in Hoffrnann-La
Roche to a situation in which, rather than reaffixing the original
manufacturer's trademark to a product, Centrafarm affixed the mark
for the first time."° American Home Products (ABP) marketed a
tranquilizer under different trademarks in different countries.0 3 The
product was sold as "Serenid D" in the United Kingdom and as
"Seresta" in The Netherlands."°4 Centrafarm purchased Serenid D
in the United Kingdom, labelled it "Seresta" (AHP's trademark) with
an annotation of its own name and address, and imported it into The
Netherlands for sale there. 5 The ECJ directed the national court
to determine whether the practice of using different marks for the
same product was "for the purpose of partitioning markets. '""°6 If it
was, national trademark rights could not be used to exclude imports,
98. Id., 3 C.M.L.R. at 241-42.
99. Id. at 1164-65, 3 C.M.L.R. at 242.
100. Id. at 1164, 3 C.M.L.R. at 242.
101. Id. at 1165, 3 C.M.L.R. at 242; see also Case 1/81, Pfizer Inc. v. Eurim-Pharm GmbH,
1981 E.C.R. 2913, 2928, 1 C.M.L.R. 406, 422 (1982) (importer repackaged product with original
trademark still visible and clearly indicated that the product was manufactured by a subsidiary
of the proprietor and repackaged by the importer).
102. Case 3W78, Centrafarm BV v. American Home Prods. Corp., 1978 E.C.R. 1823, 1843,
1 C.M.L.R. 326, 344 (1979) [hereinafter American Home Products Corp.].
103. Id. at 1824-25, 1 C.M.L.R. at 328.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1825, 1 C.M.L.R. at 328.
106. Id. at 1842, 1 C.M.L.R. at 343.
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even if labelled by Centrafarm with AHP's trademark without A-P's
consent.1' 7
In Winthrop, the ECJ sacrificed the rights of the trademark
holder, and therefore the incentive aspect of trademark protection, to
the free movement of goods with little apparent concern for the
economic or policy justification for trademarks. The rationale of the
ECJ for this sacrifice was the exhaustion of rights doctrine.108 In
Hoffinann-La Roche and American Home Products, the ECJ reached
the same result, but did consider the function of the trademark in
denoting the origin of the product.1" Because the origin of the
product, whether marketed directly by Hoffman-La Roche and AHP
or indirectly by Centrafarm, was the same, the function of the
trademark as a guarantee of origin was served. The ECI, however,
failed to protect adequately the goodwill aspect of trademark rights,
without which the trademark owner has no incentive to promote the
function of the guarantee of origin. Moreover, in the later
Centrafarm cases, the ECJ went further because the owner of the
trademark rights in those cases had not taken action to exhaust his or
her rights where his or her trademark was placed on the products by
a third party.11° By allowing and even encouraging Centrafarm to
associate its name on the package with the trademarks of Hoffman-La
Roche and AHP, the ECI allowed Centrafarm to take an extra free
ride because consumers would begin to associate "Centrafarm" with
the goodwill attributable to those other marks.
Pharmon BVv. Hoechst AG, a 1984 decision, may give some hope
to trademark owners even though the facts of the case involve patent,
not trademark, rights.1 Hoechst owned patents in the United
Kingdom and The Netherlands on the process for manufacturing a
drug known as "frusemide." A British company, DDSA, obtained a
compulsory license from the British government for manufacture of the
drug for sale within the United Kingdom only. In violation of the
terms of the compulsory license, DDSA exported the frusemide which
107. See id. at 1842, 1 C.M.L.R. at 343.
108. Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. at 1194,2 C.M.L.R. at 508-09.
109. See Hoffmann-La Roche, 1978 E.C.R. at 1164, 3 C.M.L.R. at 241; American Home
Products Corp., 1978 E.C.R. at 1840, 1 C.M.L.R. at 342-43.
110. See Hoffman-La Roche, 1978 E.C.R. at 1162, 3 C.M.L.R. at 240; American Home
Products Corp., 1978 E.C.R. 1825, 1 C.M.L.R. at 328.
111. Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R. 2281, 3 C.M.L.R. 775 (1985)
[hereinafter Pharmon].
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it had manufactured to Pharmon in The Netherlands. Hoechst sought
to restrain Pharmon's infringement of its Netherlands patent.
The ECI repeated its formulation of the substance of a patent
right (the exclusive right of first placing the product on the market)
and concluded that the actions of DDSA and Pharmon deprived
Hoechst of this right." Accordingly, the EC. permitted Hoechst to
use its Netherlands patent rights, under Article 36, to exclude the
infringing frusemide. In particular, the ECJ focused on Hoechst's lack
of consent to the manufacture and sale of frusemide by DDSA in the
United Kingdom because DDSA was acting under compulsory
license.' The decision manifests a more sympathetic attitude to
exhaustion of rights in the absence of consent of the owner of
trademark rights than the Centrafarn cases suggest.
C. The Doctrine of Common Origin
The doctrine of common origin must be viewed in the context of
the ECJ theory of exhaustion of rights. That theory maintains that the
trademark holder's rights are exhausted when the trademarked product
is first placed on the market anywhere in the EC with the trademark
owner's consent. By analogy, the ECJ has propounded a doctrine
under which a disposal of the trademark-rather than the trademarked
product-such as by license or assignment (a "sub-division" of the
trademark in the phraseology of the ECJ) also constitutes an exhaus-
tion of the trademark holder's rights."4 As first formulated by the
ECJ, the doctrine of common origin would even apply in the absence
of consent. This leads to the conclusion that trademarks in different
territories that had the same owner at any time in their history and
that have come to be owned separately at some point in history, do
not permit either owner to prevent the imports of the other."5
The factual situation in which the ECJ conceived this notion is
quite exceptional." 6 The German company Hag AG developed a
112. See id. at 2298, 3 C.M.LR. at 791.
113. See id.
114. See Case 192f73, Van Zuylen Fr~res v. Hag AG, 1974 E.C.R. 731,745,2 C.M.L.R. 127,
144-45 (1974) [hereinafter Van Zuylen Freres v. HagAG]. The term "sub-division" was first used
by the ECJ in Terrapin v. Terranova, 1976 E.C.R. at 1061, 2 C.M.L.R. at 506 (reaffirming the
doctrine of common origin). It assumes the existence of a single right which is subdivided. This
is misleading because the cases in the EC involve multiple rights under the laws of multiple
jurisdictions.
115. See Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag AG, 1974 E.C.R. at 743-44,2 C.M.L.R. at 143-44.
116. The description of the facts is taken from Hag II, 1990 E.C.R. 3711, 3712-13, 3
C.M.L.R. 571, 572-73.
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process to decaffeinate coffee and registered the "Hag" trademark for
that product in Germany in 1907. In 1908 it also registered trademarks
in Belgium, which it subsequently assigned to a Belgian subsidiary,
Hag S.A.. Following the Second World War, Hag S.A. was seized by
the Belgian government as enemy property and sold to the Van
Oevelen family. Subsequently, the Belgian "Hag" trademark was
assigned by Hag S.A. to Van Zuylen Fr~res.17 In 1972 Hag AG
began to export its German "Hag" decaffeinated coffee from Germany
into Luxembourg. Van Zuylen Fr~res thereupon brought an infringe-
ment action in Luxembourg to restrain the practice, relying on its
Benelux "Hag" mark."' The ECJ, sacrificing both the specific
subject matter and the essential function of the trademark to the free
movement of goods, propounded a doctrine:
To prohibit the marketing in one Member State of a product legally
bearing a trade mark in another Member State for the sole reason
that an identical trade mark, having the same origin, exists in the
first State, is incompatible with the provisions for the free movement
of goods within the Common Market."9
This decision, known as Hag I, clearly does not serve the interests
of the trademark holder, Van Zuylen Fr~res, which, along with its
Belgian predecessors, had been investing time and effort in generating
goodwill for the "Hag" mark in the Benelux territory for some 30
years. The German imports could now free ride on that investment.
Moreover, confusion of the Belgian and Luxembourg consumers would
likely result upon seeing a decaffeinated coffee bearing the "Hag"
mark on the store shelves. Consumers would naturally assume that it
was the "Hag" they knew and which came from Van Zuylen Fr~res as
it had for years, rather than a different product from the former
German parent. The decision was the subject of considerable
academic commentary.'
It is against this background that the Hag 11 case, which over-
turned Hag I, was greeted with great relief. After Hag I, Van Zuylen
Fr~res went through a series of corporate changes and was succeeded
117. By the time of assignment in 1971, the marks were Benelux marks pursuant to the
Benelux trademark treaty. Benelux Convention on Trade Marks, Mar. 19, 1962, art. 29, 704
U.N.T.S. 342,356.
118. Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag AG, 1974 E.C.R. at 731,2 C.M.L.R. at 127.
119. Id. at 745,2 C.M.L.R. at 144.
120. See, eg., Ren6 Joliet, Trademark Law and the Free Movement of Goods: The
Overruling of the Judgment in Hag 1, 22 INT'L REv. INDus. PRoP. & COPYRIGHT L. 303,304 n.2
(1991); J.A. Kemp, The Erosion of Trade Mark Rights in Europe, 11 CoMMON MKr. L. REv. 360
(1974).
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by CNL-Sucal, a subsidiary of the Swiss Jacobs-Suchard company,
which is a major seller of coffee products in Germany. Having
suffered at the hands of parallel imports of "Hag" coffee from
Germany into Benelux, CNL-Sucal began to export its "Hag"
decaffeinated coffee from Belgium into Germany. Hag AG now
sought to rely upon its German trademark rights to prohibit these
imports into Germany. The German lower court granted Hag AG's
claim." On appeal within the German court system, the
Oberlandesgericht (the higher regional court) in Hamburg sought to
distinguish the present case in which the beneficiary of expropriation
sought to violate the trademark rights of the victim of expropriation
from the facts of Hag I case in which the beneficiary of the expropria-
tion had purchased the "Hag" mark knowing that it was owned in
Germany by the original owner.' The Oberlandesgericht also
proposed that to allow the CNL-Sucal products to violate the German
trademark would be to give extraterritorial effect in Germany to the
Belgian expropriation. m Ultimately, the case came before the
Bundesgerichtshof (federal appeals court) which referred the questions
of Community law to the EC1.4 Reviewing the case law of the ECJ
and stressing the importance of the economic function of trademarks,
Advocate General Jacobs proposed that the doctrine of common origin
lacked any foundation in the EEC Treaty'2 Insofar as the facts of
Hag II were concerned, the EC agreed.'
While Hag II represents an abandonment by the ECJ of its most
extreme formulation of the doctrine of common origin, it does not
represent the total abandonment of that doctrine. The ECJ has
recognized that the common origin of trademarks in two different
territories does not justify restricting the rights of the trademark
owners in either of those territories. 7 Thus far, however, the ECJ
has recognized this only where the event which separated one mark
from its original owner was government expropriation (or presumably
121. The lower court decision is apparently unreported, but is summarized in Joliet, supra
note 120, at 305 n.4.
122. Case 3u 133/86, Re HAG Coffee, 3 C.M.L.R. 154, 162 (1989) [hereinafter Re HAG
Coffee]. For a discussion of the Oberlandesgericht decision, see Ann Marie De Die, Re HAG
Coffee-Now the National Courts Decide, 12 EYR. INTEL. PROP. REv. 145 (1988).
123. Re HAG Coffee, 3 C.M.L.R. at 164.
124. Hag II, 1990 E.C.R. at 3713, 3 C.M.L.R. at 575.
125. See id. at 3730-31, 3 C.M.L.R. at 581--82.
126. See id. at 3760-61,3 C.M.L.R. at 609-10. The ECI drafted its ruling narrowly to apply
only to a situation where a third party acquires a trademark following expropriation. Id.
127. See id. at 3759, 3 C.M.LR. at 609.
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any other event without the consent of the owner)." Even after
Hag II, the doctrine of common origin retains its vitality where the
separation of trademark rights from the original owner in one territory
took place with the consent of the trademark owner. This has come
to be known as the doctrine of consensual common origin. 29
VI. THE DECISIONS OF THE ECJ VERSUS THE FUNCTION
OF TRADEMARKS
A trademark serves the function of protecting the investment of
the trademark owner in goodwill (to the ECJ, the specific subject
matter of the trademark) and providing the consumer with an easy
indication of the source and quality of the trademarked products (to
the ECI, the essential function of the trademark). The decisions of the
ECJ, however, do not serve either aspect of this function. The
existence/exercise dichotomy, the expansive doctrine of exhaustion of
rights and its progeny, and the doctrine of consensual common origin
all deprive the trademark owner of goodwill and ultimately promote
consumer confusion. The result is damage to the utility of trademarks
and hence damage to the efficient allocation of resources, which is the
ultimate purpose of the policy of free movement of goods.
To understand the likely effect of the attitude of the ECJ towards
the function of trademarks, it is necessary first to recall that the
specific subject matter of the trademark and its essential function are
not ultimately distinct, but are views of function of trademarks from
two different angles. In the absence of the reward for goodwill,
businesses would lack the incentive to invest in trademark recognition,
and trademarks would not serve the function of preventing consumer
confusion. Furthermore, the self-policing mechanism of trademark
enforcement would cease to operate because the trademark owner
would have no incentive to restrain pirates, and consumer confusion
would ensue.
128. In this respect Hag II is the direct descendant of Pharmon, 1985 E.C.R. 2298, 3
C.M.L.R. 791 (holding that a patent owner could prevent the marketing of a patent if it was
granted to a third party by compulsory license and therefore without the original owner's
consent).
129. For an illustration of this doctrine, see Sirena v. Eda, 1971 E.C.R. 69,71,1971 C.M.L.R.
260,262. Note that the doctrine of consensual common origin applies only to restrict the exercise
of trademarked rights against imports within the EC, because Article 30 of the EEC Treaty
applies only to free movement of goods within the EC. See EMI Records, 1976 E.C.R. at 845,
2 C.M.L.R. at 264.
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A. The Existence/Exercise Dichotomy
It is misleading to separate the existence of trademark rights from
their exercise. Recall the definition of property which Landes and
Posner set forth as a legally sanctioned right to exclude others from
the use of a resource; that is, the exercise of a property right defines
its existence. This is especially clear in the case of intangibles such as
industrial property rights. Whereas the owner of land can enjoy the
land (i.e., build on it, farm it, and exclude trespassers), and the owner
of an automobile can enjoy the automobile (i.e., drive it, behold its
beauty, and prevent others from driving it), all that the owner of a
trademark has is the right to exclude others from its use. From the
perspective of its owner, there is nothing else for which a trademark
is of benefit. As Ren6 Joliet put it, if the exercise of national
trademark rights is reduced, the existence of those rights is called into
question.' °
Joliet also expresses his objection to the existence/exercise
dichotomy in more legal terms."3 He points out that the competition
policy objection under Article 85(1), which the ECI expressed in
Consten and Grundig, is not an objection to the exercise of industrial
property rights, but an objection to an anticompetitive agreement.1 32
This suggests that the proper legal characterization of the attack on
agreements that divide markets is to oppose the agreement under the
competition rules, not the exercise of trademark rights through
infringement actions in the member state courts.? 3  The exis-
tence/exercise dichotomy is therefore unnecessary to promote the free
movement of goods because the latter is adequately protected by
Article 85(1).
The situation where a trademark is affixed to a product without
the trademark owner's consent is analogous to the use of a patent
without the patentee's consent in Pharmon, and the result should be
the same; the trademark owner should be entitled to rely on his or her
trademark rights to exclude imports. The ECJ stated in Pharmon that
"the substance of a patent right lies essentially in according the
inventor an exclusive right of first placing the product on the market
so as to allow him or her to obtain the reward for his or her creative
130. Joliet, supra note 120, at 314.
131. See id. at 314-15. Joliet is encouraged by the fact that Hag II does not repeat the
existence/exercise dichotomy. Id.
132. See id. at 314.
133. See Ui
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effort."'" Similarly, the substance of a trademark right lies in
according its owner an exclusive right of placing the trademarked
product on the market to allow him or her the reward of his or her
investment in the associated goodwill."5
B. Exhaustion Rights and the Doctrine of Common Origin
The doctrine of common origin as espoused by the ECJ in Hag I
"is not a legitimate creature of Community law,"' and, in the
absence of consent, is inconsistent with subsequent case law.137
However, even the doctrine of consensual common origin remaining
after Hag II is not justified by the EEC Treaty or by the function of
trademarks. If national property rights are protected under Article
222, then the EEC Treaty should also protect the right of the property
owner to reap the maximum reward from those rights.
Just as the owner of a house may live in the house, rent it out,
live on the upper floor and rent the lower, or sell the property, the
owner of a trademark may use it by affixing the trademark to the
owner's products, assigning it in whole, or licensing it in part. Under
the doctrine of consensual common origin, the trademark owner may
suffer a loss to its goodwill if the trademarked goods of another (albeit
bearing the trademark with the original owner's consent) can compete
with its original owner's marked products. To suggest that such a rule
does not affect the existence of the trademark owner's property rights
is comparable to suggesting that the owner of the house can rent it
out, but the tenants are permitted to burn it down. In either case, the
likely result of such a law is to encourage the owner to prohibit the use
of his or her property by others. In the case of trademark rights, this
means less investment in trademark creation and use, increased
consumer search costs, and inefficient allocation of resources.
Moreover, the doctrine of consensual common origin is likely to
cause consumer confusion because a licensee or assignee may sell
products under a mark different from those sold by the original owner
or by another licensee or assignee.us As Advocate General Jacobs
stated, "[t]he consumer is not, I think, interested in the genealogy of
trademarks; he is interested in knowing who made the goods that he
134. Phannon, 1985 E.C.R. at 2298, 3 C.M.L.R. at 791.
135. See Hag If, 1990 E.C.R. at 3758, 3 C.M.L.R. at 608.
136. Id. at 3736, 3 C.M.L.R. at 588 (Jacobs, A.G.).
137. See id. at 3737-38, 3 C.M.L.R. at 588-90.
138. See, e.g., Sirena v. Eda, 1971 E.C.R. at 80-81, 1971 C.M.L.R. at 272.
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purchases." 9 Joliet argues that assignment of a trademark, that is,
the complete divestment by the owner of a trademark in several
member states of his or her trademark rights in one member state with
no continuing control or influence over the goods to which the mark
is attached, should be treated in the same manner as the divestment
of the "Hag" trademark in Hag IL1' Under this analysis, both the
assignor and the assignee would be permitted to use their national
trademark rights to exclude the products of the other.141
Joliet does, however, argue that where there is an element of
common control between the owners of trademark rights in different
territories, such as may be the case when marks in different territories
are owned by different members of the same group,14 or in the case
of trademark licenses in which the licensor continues to dictate product
quality,43 national trademark rights should not permit the opposition
of imports from another territory.1 " The analysis in such a case of
common control should be the same as that proposed above in the
context of exhaustion of rights. The trial court should consider
whether the trademarked goods are the same and whether they are
subject to price differentials imposed by the controlling entity. If the
answer to either question is no, the trademark owner in one territory
should be entitled to exclude imports from another, unless it can be
shown that the owner's behavior violates the competition rules of the
EEC Treaty.
The competition rules may not apply in fact situations such as
Deutsche Grammophon45 and Sirena v. Edae where the exercise
of trademark rights is a unilateral act and no agreement exists which
139. Hag I, 1990 E.C.1. at 3735,3 C.M.L.R. at 586 (Jacobs, A.G.). To the same effect, the
recitals to the Directive state that the function of the trademark is "as an indication of origin."
Directive, supra note 59, at 2.
140. See Joliet, supra note 120, at 317.
141. For another argument in favor of expanding Hag 11 to assignments, and thereby
overruling Sirena, see Gerd F. Kunze, Waiting for Sirena II-Trademark Assignment in the Case
Law of the European Court of Justice, 22 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 319,326-33
(1991).
142. See Joliet, supra note 120, at 317.
143. Id. at 313.
144. Id. at 314.
145. Deutsche Grammophon, 1971 E.C.R. 487, 1971 C.M.L.R. 631, although in that case
Deutsche Grammophon's pricing practices were challenged under the competition rules of Article
86 of the EEC Treaty, which can apply to unilateral acts. See id. at 500-01,1971 C.M.L.R. at 658.
146. See Sirena v. Eda, 1971 E.C.R. 69,1971 C.M.L.R. 260 (Sirena unilaterally sought to use
its Italian trademark right to exclude imports marked "Prep"). The ECI actually based its
decision on Article 85(1), finding, as the required agreement, a 1937 trademark assignment. See
id. at 80, 82, 1971 C.M.L.R. at 272-74.
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can be challenged under the competition rules. Accordingly, the Joliet
approach does not provide a comprehensive manner in which to attack
anticompetitive practices without impugning trademark rights. In
Deutsche Grammophon the ECI therefore relied on the doctrine of
exhaustion of rights, which it extended to trademarks in Centrafarm
BV v. Winthrop BV.'47
In the scenario involving a trademark holder seeking to exclude
his or her own products, the exhaustion doctrine may serve the
function of trademark law and restrain anticompetitive practices,
subject to two caveats. First, the product must be identical in each
territory. Otherwise, consumer confusion will ensue. Where different
products are sold under the same mark in different territories, the
trademark owner is merely serving the socially useful self-policing
function by keeping out different products, even if they are his or her
own, and thereby saving consumers from confusion. While there may
be a risk that a manufacturer would purposefully develop different
products under the same mark in order to use its trademark rights to
prevent the free movement of its goods and to preserve price
differentials in different territories, there is no basis to assume that this
is the only reason why a trademark owner would sell different products
under the same mark. Nor is there any basis in the EEC reaty to
deprive the trademark owner of his or her property rights, which are
protected by Article 222, absent a showing that this was in fact a
practice devised to divide markets rather than a legitimate business
practice based on consumer preferences."4  In American Home
Products, the ECI proposed a fact inquiry to determine why AHP
marketed the same product under different marks.149 A similar
approach could be taken to determine why a producer markets
different products under the same mark.'
Second, the price differential for the products in different markets,
if there is one, must be due to the actions of the trademark owner.151
147. Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. at 1198-99,2 C.M.L.R. at 507.
148. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
149. See American Home Products Corp., 1978 E.C.R. at 1842, 1 C.M.L.R. at 343.
150. Alternately, the doctrine of exhaustion of rights, in its present form, would presumably
give a trademark owner an incentive to abandon the practice, whatever his or her reasons. While
some consumer confusion would result during a transitional period, the social costs of such
confusion might be less than the social costs of market division and the costs of making the
factual enquiry.
151. Cf Deutsche Grammophon, 1971 E.C.R. at 502, 1971 C.M.L.R. at 659 (holding that a
price differential by an owner may be an abuse of a dominant position). At least one writer has
noted that if a trademark owner adopts a unified pricing structure, the incentive for others to
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A contrary rule would provide an incentive to the trademark owner to
use trademark rights to divide markets. A clear doctrine of exhaustion
of rights in this situation would discourage discriminatory pricing. The
corollary is that the exhaustion doctrine should not apply where price
differentials exist through no fault of the trademark owner. If it did,
the rule would punish the trademark owner for the actions of others
with the effect of removing the incentive to invest in the trademark
without creating an incentive to equalize prices. This is because the
relative prices are beyond the power of the trademark holder.' 2
VII. CONCLUSION
Starting with the Consten and Grundig decision in the 1960s and
continuing through the Sirena, Hag I, and Centrafarm cases in the
1970s, the ECJ has passed through a period of sacrificing national
trademark rights to the principle of free movement of goods. In more
recent decisions, such as Pharmon and Hag II, there has been a shift
as the ECI affords greater recognition to the value of national
industrial property rights, despite the fact that this may appear to
hinder the free movement of goods. The ECJ has also recognized
trademarks as a guarantee of origin and an instrument to prevent
consumer confusion.
The ECJ, however, has not yet fully accepted the role of the
trademark holder as the private prosecutor of those who would
confuse consumers. Nor has the ECJ fully accepted the idea that
trademarks, through the performance of their two functions, may
actually promote efficient allocation of resources. The ECJ should
abandon the existence/exercise dichotomy and the doctrine of common
origin. The legal basis for both doctrines is dubious. The apparent
tension between trademark rights and the free movement of goods
principle should be resolved by a reformulation of the exhaustion of
rights doctrine.
divert his or her products will likely go away. See Laurence J. Cohen, Warding Off the Foe: How
Trademarks Can Saill Offer Some Protection Against Parallel Imports, 10 ER. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 369 (1990).
152. Cf. Pharmon, 1985 E.C.R. at 2298, 3 C.M.L.R. at 791 (noting that a third party
compulsory patent deprives the original owner of right to determine conditions under which
patent should be marketed). The ECI has already proposed an analysis to distinguish proper and
improper use of industrial property rights in the case of registered designs, suggesting that if the
use violates Article 85, parallel imports must be permitted; otherwise, the proprietor of the design
may prevent the import. See Case 144/81, Keurkoop BV v. Nancy Kean Gifts BV, 1982 E.C.R.
2853, 2873-74, 2 C.M.L.R. 47, 83 (1983).
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